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-Many directors and executives are receiving 
favorable loans from their corporations. 
Executives Raid i ng the 
Corporate Cookie Jar 
by JAYNE W BARNARD 
EVERYONE NEEDS extra cash sometimes. Most people confronted with this need face limited op-
tions. They sell, they save, or they borrow. None 
of the options is easy. Borrowing may be the most diffi-
cult, especially where the collateral is chancy, the bor-
rower overextended, and the cost of borrowing high. 
But business executives frequently find a willing bank-
er right within the walls of their corporate boardroom. 
Hundreds of millions of corporate dollars annually are 
diverted away from production and expansion in order 
to finance personal loans to corporate insiders. 
Twenty-five years ago, this was not the case. Corporate 
loans to officers and directors were prohibited by law, 
except in the case of incorporated banks. The no-loan 
statutes were enacted to prevent directors from taking 
advantage of their position to grant themselves or their 
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colleagues unwarranted loans and thus dissipate cor-
porate funds in violation of their trust-a seemingly sen-
sible constraint. 
Today, however, only two states continue to prohibit 
executive loans from corporate funds. An additional 
handful require shareholder ratification for some types 
of these loans. Most states, however, require only a pro 
forma determination by the board of directors that mak-
ing the loan will afford some "benefit" to the corpora-
tion. In this context, corporate "benefit" is usually in-
terpreted to include the borrower's ability to concen-
trate on the corporation's affai rs undistracted by the 
need to raise personal cash. Some benefit. 
The results of these changes in the law have been pre-
dictable. A recent study of 152 randomly selected pub-
licly held corporations found that more than one-third 
of them had made at least one substantial executive 
loan during 1986. These loans-ranging from the 
minimum reportable amount of $60,000 to millions of 
dollars-were made to finance home purchases, the ex-
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ercise of stock options, investments in other business 
ventures, the purchase of commercial property and to 
cover undisclosed "personal" needs. Many of the loans 
were made at low- or no-interest rates with indefinite 
repayment schedules. Some were made with built-in 
"forgiveness" schedules, rendering them little more than 
executivEl bonus advances. 
Executive lending in a privately held corporation is 
not uncqmmon. After all, one reason entrepreneurs 
incorpor*te is to maximize personal gain while 
minimizirg personal risk. So when The Wall Street]our-
nat repor!ted that while Crazy Eddie, was still a private 
company, Eddie Antar, its principal shareholder and 
CEO, ha~ "virtually [used] the company as a private 
bank;' gr~nting himself $470,000 in interest-free loans, 
paying Various family members $75:000 in annual 
stipends, ,extending millions of dollars of credit to a son-
in-law's tlusiness venture (supplying cassettes to Crazy 
Eddie), arjld guaranteeing the six-digit (never repaid) bor-
rowings M still another relative, it was no great shock 
and argu~bly nobody's business save the IRS's. 
But thej story should be different in the case of public-
ly held ccilrporations whose shareholders expect that ex-
I 
cess cas~ will be distributed to them in the form of div-
idends rather than being distributed to already well-paid 
executivJs in the guise of loans. Moreover, executive 
I 
loans have frequently been an early warning signal of 
corporat¢ distress. The bankruptcy reporters are full of 
tales of i~solvent corporations whose many misjudg-
ments included the extension of substantial insider 
loans. 
A prime example is Allegheny International, which 
entered ~ankruptcy in February 1988 after years of de-
clining fd>rtunes. During fiscal year 1985, in which the 
compan~ lost a record $109 million, Allegheny made 
more thcin $32 million in low-interest loans to its of-
ficers an~ directors, to permit the exercise of stock op-
tions and for other personal (and undisclosed) purposes. 
LTV, d~ring a year in which it lost $378.2 million and 
was forc4d to close its Pennsylvania manufacturing op-
erations, i made an interest-free loan of $965,250 to its 
chairmari/CEO to facilitate the exercise of stock options. 
Horn 4 Hardart Co., which in 1986 lost $28.4 million 
and whose share value had dropped by more than half 
since 19$3, in 1984 made and later extended six-figure 
personal! loans to two of its top executives. 
Recen~ly South mark Corp., whose share value 
dropped nearly 70 percent during 1987, announced that 
it would i be forced to sell some of its major assets in 
order to :raise cash and reduce its heavy debt burden. 
Shortly ~efore that announcement, the company dis-
closed tHat it had provided an $8.5 million line of credit 
to its ch~irman and vice chairman "so that [they] would 
be able to meet any loan margin calls resulting from 
Call to Action 
"None of us likes paying taxes. But all of us rec-
ognize the necessity of doing so. And as long as 
those taxes are levied as fairly as possible, with an 
intelligent regard for their long-term effect on eco-
nomic growth, they can give us the resources we 
need as a community to maintain the schools, hos-
pitals, roads and public agencies that are the frame-
work for free enterprise. I'll go a step further. There 
are times when instead of opposing tax increases, 
the business community has a duty to support them. 
"Consider, for example, the ruinous federal defi-
cits that are destroying our fiscal stability and credi-
bility. We've doubled the national debt in six years. 
We've amassed more I.Q.U:s since 1981 than in the 
entire previous history of the republic. Historians will 
eventually assign the blame for this debacle. There's 
plenty to go around. 
"In the meantime, we need action, not accusations. 
And faced as we are with a national fiscal crisis, I 
think some form of federal tax increase is absolutely 
justified. In my opinion, the business community 
should be breathing fire at Congress and the Presi-
dent over this issue:' 
- J. Richard Munro, chairman 
of Time Inc., at the University 
of Southern Florida, Tampa, 
on November 16, 1987 
recent declines in the market price of [Southmark's] 
common stock ... :' Needless to say, Southmark's 
public shareholders were not afforded the same privi-
lege. 
It is not likely that the state laws authorizing executive 
loans will revert to their earlier prohibitory form. Every 
time a state "modernizes" its corporate law, one of the 
first changes made is the inclusion of a loan-enabling 
provision. The theory, encompassed in the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, is that loans are a necessary 
means of attracting top-quality executives. This pre-
sumes that worthy candidates for boardroom positions 
would take a less attractive job for less money rather 
than endure the hardship of having to borrow money 
from a flinthearted banker as the other employees do. 
In today's business world, the idea that executives 
should, like their shareholders, confront the trials of 
commercial borrowing, and use corporate funds for cor-
porate needs, is a heretical notion. 0 
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